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A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among
Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases
By Jon D. Jensvold*
I. INTRODUCTION
The acceptance in Minnesota of the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity in tort1 has given rise to several important and intricate
questions concerning the rights of defendants to common law
indemnity and contribution. Since the proponents of strict li-
ability were primarily interested in protecting injured plaintiffs,
it is not surprising that they should have paid scant attention
to the rights of jointly and severally liable defendants. How-
ever, their inattentiveness has resulted in an unfortunate exten-
sion of common law rules governing loss allocation based on
fault to situations where, at least in its legal definition, "fault"
does not necessarily exist.
Part of the problem stems from the fact that in Minnesota,
as elsewhere, the law of indemnity had attained a high degree
of development prior to the acceptance of strict liability. Al-
though the Minnesota Supreme Court purportedly rejected the
so-called "disparity in degree of fault" test in Hendrickson v.
Minnesota Power & Light Co. 2 and instead enumerated five ex-
clusive situations in which indemnity would be allowed,3 it has
strayed from the restrictive Hendrickson guidelines in several
* Attorney for the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group.
1. The doctrine of strict liability in tort as set out in RF.STATE-
AmqT (SEcoND) OF ToaRs § 402A (1965) was first discussed and ap-
proved in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488
(1967). However, actual application of the doctrine had to wait for
subsequent cases. See, e.g., Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc,
295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co,
288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).2. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960).
3. The court in Hendrickson held that indemnity was possible in
situations where there was (a) derivative or vicarious liability; (b) ac-
tion at the direction of or for another; (c) breach of a duty to the
party seeking indemnity; (d) failure to discover the misconduct of an-
other; or (e) an express contract for indemnity.
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subsequent decisions. It now appears that general equitable
principles often determine rights to indemnity, with primary at-
tention being directed to the conduct of the parties and the rela-
tive culpability of their actions.4 In short, the concepts of
"fault" and "duty"--renounced by the doctrine of strict liability
-are often determinative of the rights of defendants inter se.
The reason that manufacturers and distributors are held
strictly liable for the harm caused by their products is that li-
ability based on negligence does not adequately protect consum-
ers from risks of bodily harm inevitably created by a mass pro-
duction and marketing system.5 Yet in the same action in which
multiple defendants are held to be strictly liable to an injured
plaintiff, strict application of the principles of indemnity re-
quires that the claims of the defendants against each other be
determined by traditional notions of fault, according to charac-
terization of their participation as "active" or "passive." This
anomalous situation clearly contravenes the social policies em-
bodied in the doctrine of strict liability.0
The problems caused by the use of the common law rules
governing contribution are somewhat different. The catch
phrase "equality is equity" illustrates the common law require-
ment that all jointly liable defendants contribute equal amounts
toward the plaintiff's total award.7 This traditional approach
does successfully avoid the anomaly of using relative degrees
of fault as a method for allocating losses among non-negligent
defendants. However, in so doing it ignores the fact that al-
though all the defendants in a strict liability case may be equally
faultless, the activities of some may have been more directly
the cause of the plaintiff's injuries than the activities of others.
These problems are of substantial practical importance in
modern tort litigation. The abolition of "privity" requirements
4. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674
(1965); Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964). But
see Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d
140 (1972).
5. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.
2d 488, 500 (1967); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791 (1966).
6. For example, one of two defendants guilty of nearly identical
negligence may get off scot free. See, e.g., Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods.
Co., 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967).




for most tort actions s together with today's liberal rules for join-
der9 have greatly increased the number of multi-party actions
with their frequent claims for indemnity and contribution. The
purpose of this Article is to suggest that, as ironic as it may
seem, the rationale of the Minnesota comparative negligence
statute'0 offers a possible alternative to the use of common law
principles of indemnity and contribution in actions where strict
liability in tort is alleged. Admittedly, it does seem self-contra-
dictory to suggest that the problems caused by the use of rela-
tive degrees of fault as a means of allocating losses among non-
negligent defendants can be solved by resort to a comparative
negligence statute. However, the Minnesota statute contains a
rule which can be generalized to apply in all situations"-that
contribution among jointly liable defendants shall be in pro-
portion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each.
Since a plaintiff's contributory negligence is at least a partial
defense to an action founded solely upon strict liability,12 the
issue of the plaintiff's negligence may be submitted to the jury
under the statute with ,the further instruction that it be com-
pared to the strict liability of the defendants.'3  So applied, the
comparative negligence statute becomes more than a compara-
tive negligence or even a comparative fault statute; it becomes
a comparative cause statute under which all independent and
concurrent causes of an accident may be apportioned on a per-
centage basis. Such an application of the statute permits an
apportionment of economic loss among all defendants in a man-
ner fully consistent with the principles underlying the doctrine
of strict liability.
8. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488(1967) (warranty and strict liability cases); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn.
543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) (implied warranty cases); Schubert v. J. R.
Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892) (negligence cases). And
in Froysland v. Leef Bros., 293 Minn. 201, 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972), the
plaintiff was held to be a third party beneficiary to an express warranty
made to his employer.
9. See, e.g., MINx. R. Cxv. P. 14, 18, 20.
10. MAnm. STAT. § 604.01 (1971). The statute applies to all actions
tried after July 1, 1969.
11. The last sentence of MnN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971) reads:
When there are two or more persons who are jointly liable,
contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage
of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each
shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.
12. See Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 46-50, 171 N.W.
2d 201, 210-12 (1969) (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
13. Cf. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
19741
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
II. APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES
OF INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION TO STRICT
LIABILITY SITUATIONS
A. DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL BASES OF INDEMNITY AND
CoNTRIBUTmoN IN MINNESOTA
Indemnity is the right of one party held liable to another
to shift the entire burden of liability to a third party also liable
for the same harm;' 4 contribution is the right to shift part of
that liability. Contribution has its origins in equity, where a
defendant was required to contribute to a fellow defendant who
relieved him of his obligation to pay the plaintiff's damages.",
Accordingly, it invariably has been held that "common liability"
is the very essence of the action for contribution. If the one
from whom contribution is sought is not liable to the person
harmed, there is no basis for contribution.'0
The right to indemnity is not based upon the discharge of
a common obligation, but rather results from the violation of
a duty owed to the indemnitee by the one sought to be charged.17
Indemnity shifts the entire liability to the party whose wrongful
conduct resulted in the imposition of legal liability upon another
who is "morally innocent."' 8  While there was some confusion
as late as 1965,19 it now appears firmly settled that common li-
ability is not a prerequisite to the recovery of indemnity.20
Because of the difference in their historical bases, it has
been steadfastly maintained that indemnity and contribution are
fundamentally different doctrines, and therefore "full contribu-
tion" and "partial indemnity" are contradictions in terms." This
14. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn.
368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d
252 (1957).
15. However, contribution is available only to defendants who are
guilty of no intentional wrongdoing. See Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn.
109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887); Comment, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1089 (1969).
16. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d
847 (1953). But cf. White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674
(1965).
17. See Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W.
698 (1883); accord, Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d
355 (1954); Olson v. Schultz, 67 Minn. 494, 70 N.W. 779 (1897).
18. See Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 114 N.W.2d 68
(1962).
19. See White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 374, 137 N.W.2d 674, 681
(1965) (Otis, J., dissenting).
20. See, e.g., Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193
N.W.2d 305 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Bjorklund v. Hantz, 208 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1973);
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unswerving belief is based on historical anachronisms and se-
mantic quibbling and has given birth to a number of anomalies
and absurdities which become apparent in the context of strict
liability.
B. STRICT LmiAL rY: ITS DEFINITION AND SIGNIFICANCE
The doctrine of strict liability in tort, as set out in section
402A of the RESTATEmE (SECOND) OF ToRTs, was first embraced
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in McCormack v. Hankscraft
Co.22 That section provides:
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably- dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.2 3
As Dean Prosser has properly cautioned,2 4 it is important
not to overestimate the changes actually brought about by the
acceptance of strict liability in tort. The liability imposed by
section 402A is similar to the liability which was traditionally
incurred by a seller of a product who breached an implied war-
ranty of merchantability.25 The real significance of strict liabil-
ity lies in its recognition that the seller's liability is tortious,
not contractual; such purely "contractual" defenses as the sell-
er's lack of notice of a defect in his product or the lack of priv-
ity of contract between the seller of a defective product and
Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37
uRNN. L. REv. 470 (1953).
22. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). The doctrine has been
used in a number of subsequent cases. See Waite v. American Creosote
Works, Inc., 295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973); Farr v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 288 Minm 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Magnuson v. Rupp
Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969); Kerr v. Corning Glass
Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969).
23. ISTAEN (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
24. W. PnossE, LAW OF Toxrrs § 98 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429
(N.D. Ind. 1965); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 91, 179
N.W.2d 64, 70 (1970).
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its ultimate user are unavailing.2 The elimination of these de-
fenses means that sellers and manufacturers 27 of defective prod-
ucts may be sued directly by an injured user or consumer re-
gardless of how the product reached the consumer's hands.28
Thus, the practical effect of strict liability has been to increase
substantially the number of non-negligent defendants subject to
direct suit. In the context of indemnity and contribution, strict
liability actions are unique because, for the first time, otherwise
faultless defendants may be held jointly and severally liable to
a single injured plaintiff.
C. RIGHTS TO ITDEMNITY IN SPECIFIC STRICT LiABiLry
SITUATIONS
Thus far, the Minnesota Supreme Court has dealt with in-
demnity in only one case in which the plaintiff's right to re-
covery was predicated solely upon strict liability. In Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 29 both the manufacturer and retailer
of a defective truck tire were held strictly liable in tort to the
injured plaintiffs. The trial court granted the retailer indemnity
from the manufacturer and the supreme court affirmed on ap-
peal. Relying upon the guidelines set out in Hendrickson, the
court observed that one of the circumstances under which a tort-
feasor was traditionally allowed indemnity was where he had
only a derivative or vicarious liability for damages caused by
the other. The court held that since the retailer's liability re-
sulted "solely from its passive role as the retailer of a defective
26. Dean Prosser has described the change from contractual liabil-
ity to tortious liability in the following terms:
It is warranty only that has gone overboard, and with it
all idea that the plaintiff's recovery is founded on a contract,
as well as the statutory provisions. In particular it is the con-
tract defenses, such as lack of notice to the seller and disclaim-
ers, which are out of the window. The cases of warranty,
whether on a direct sale between the parties or to the consumer
without privity, are still important precedents in determining
what the seller has undertaken to deliver.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971).
27. Strict liability applies to all sellers of the product, including
manufacturers and distributors. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288
Minn. 83, 96, 179 N.W.2d 64, 72 n.1 (1970).
28. Thus, Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 404 (D.
Minn.), affd, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955), which denied recovery to
a friend of the purchaser of a glass jar which shattered, is no longer
good law in Minnesota. Of course, for a distributor to be held liable,
it is necessary to show that he at some time sold to someone the ac-
tual product which caused the complained of injury.
29. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
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product furnished to it by the manufacturer,"3 0 indemnity was
proper.
While ostensibly the issues raised in Farr were resolved by
a simple and correct application of the principles expressed in
Hendrickson, the Farr case is worthy of note for at least two
reasons. First, the "faultless" retailer was allowed indemnity
from one who was, at least legally, equally faultless. Second,
the retailer's liability to the injured plaintiffs was not vicarious,
but rather was based upon the retailer's independent and voli-
tional act of selling a defective product. Since the doctrine of
strict liability makes it as tortious to sell a defective product
as to manufacture one, the retailer's liability resulted from his
own tortious conduct. Thus, it differed from truly vicarious li-
ability, which is imposed solely by reason of one's relationship
to the actor causing harm.3 1
Farr provides an excellent example of the conceptual prob-
lems which arise when traditional principles of indemnity are
applied to strict liability situations. Nevertheless, the result
reached by the court was sound. The ultimate economic loss
was shifted entirely to one whose "active" conduct (the manu-
facture of a defective tire) caused the plaintiff's injury under
circumstances where no significant independent conduct of an-
other concurred in bringing about the injury.
Although it is admittedly difficult to generalize from a sin-
gle case, Farr does shed some light on how claims for indemnity
will be treated in severaladditional strict liability situations:
1. Where the Liability of All the Defendants Is Premised Solely
on Their Strict Liability to the Plaintiff
Farr clearly stands for the proposition that where the liabil-
ity of all the defendants is premised solely on strict liability,
the loss caused by a defective product should ultimately rest
30. Id. at 97, 179 N.W.2d at 72.
31. The classic example of truly vicarious liability is reflected in
the rule of respondeat superior ("look to the man higher up"), under
which liability is imposed upon the master for certain torts of his serv-
ants. W. PRossER, LAw oF TORTS §§ 62-63 (3d ed. 1964). The liability
in Farr was more akin to the liability imposed for negligently employ-
ing a particular servant, Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 41 Minn.
360, 43 N.W. 54 (1889), or negligently entrusting a firearm to a child,
Clarine v. Addison, 182 Minn. 310, 234 N.W. 295 (1931). In these situa-
tions, it is the act of employing or entrusting, not the relationship be-
tween the defendant and actual wrongdoer, -which results in liability.
Cf. W. PRossER, LAw or ToRTs § 104 (4th ed. 1971).
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with the party at the beginning of the distributive chain.3'-' Since
each defendant is liable only if the product was in a defective
condition at the time it left his possession,3" the ultimate respon-
sibility should rest upon the one who first placed the defective
product into the stream of commerce. Thus, it follows that if
a product is defective only because one of its component parts
is defective, the ultimate responsibility for injuries caused by
the product is imposed upon the manufacturer of the component
part.3 4 This surely should not be the case, however, where a
component part is put to an unintended use with the result that
the product as a whole is rendered defective." Here, the manu-
facturer of the component part should not be liable because the
part was not defective at the time it left his possession.
The doctrinal underpinnings which allow the party at the
beginning of the distribution chain to be held liable for the en-
tire harm suffered by the plaintiff are not unique to strict li-
ability cases. One who furnishes a defective product to another
breaches an implied warranty of merchantability 0 for which an
action for indemnity will lie.37 Since the terms "defective con-
dition" and "unmerchantable" are for all practical purposes syn-
onymous,38 and since in the typical case there is no dispute as
to how the defective product got into the plaintiff's hands, the
findings of fact which give rise to strict liability are identical
to those necessary to determine rights to indemnity for breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability 9
32. This is analogous to the principles behind liability on a nego-
tiable instrument. Although an endorser of an instrument is liable to
all subsequent holders in due course, he is allowed to recover from the
maker. The result is that the loss is ultimately placed upon the party
who first negotiated the worthless instrument.
33. See Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d
587 (1969).
34. Cf. Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967);
McDonald v. Blue Jeans Corp., 183 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
35. Cf. Borg Warner Corp. v. White Motor Co., 344 F.2d 412 (5th
Cir. 1965).
36. The "implied" warranty of merchantability is now statutorily
mandated by the Uniform Commercial Code. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-
314(2) (1971), which provides in part that "[g]oods to be merchantable
must be at least such as . .. (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used. .. ."
37. See note 30 supra. But cf. Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 291
Minn. 105, 189 N.W.2d 701 (1971).
38. See Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 88-93, 179
N.W.2d 64, 68-71 (1970).
39. But arguably a retailer may not recover indemnity from a
manufacturer on an implied warranty theory where the retailer pur-
chased the offending product from an intervening distributor, since the
[Vol. 58:723
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2. Where One or More Defendants Have Breached
an Implied Warranty
In view of the foregoing discussion, one held liable for the
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability seems to have
the same recourse against those nearer to the beginning of the
chain of distribution as does one held strictly liable in tort. In-
deed, this inference can properly be drawn from Farr itself.40
However, it is questionable whether all breaches of implied war-
ranties will be treated alike. For example, the breach of an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose might well
bar a seller from the recovery of indemnity.41 The seller's li-
ability in this case is founded upon his failure to exercise skill
and judgment in selecting goods to fulfill the requirements made
known to him by the buyer. The exercise of such skill and
judgment could well be considered an independent undertaking,
which would make indemnity inappropriate.42
3. Where One or More Defendants Are Also Negligent
Although Farr does not discuss the availability of indemnity
where one or more of the defendants in a strict liability action
are found negligent, its acceptance of the traditional approach
to indemnity suggests that the negligence of the indemnitee will
bar his claim. This is the result of the general rule that one
who is causally negligent may not recover indemnity, except
where his negligence is imputed or consists entirely of his fail-
ure to discover or prevent the negligence of another.43 Put an-
other way, one whose negligence is "independent and concur-
rent" is in pari delecto with other defendants and therefore must
requirement of "privity" has been abrogated by "strict liability" only
with respect to actions brought by the injured user or consumer, and
thus may still be required as between the retailer and manufacturer.
40. In granting the retailer indemnity, the court recognized that
it "was found liable [to the plaintiffs] either on the grounds of breach
of implied warranty or of strict liability in tort." Farr v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 96, 179 N.W.2d 64, 72 (1970).
41. The implied -warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is cod-
fied in 1ITNN. STAT. § 336.2-315 (1971), which provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
42. See Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d 69
(1970). But cf. Bjorklund v. Hantz, 208 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1973).
43. See, e.g., Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d 252
(1957); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
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be denied indemnity.44 Some decisions have used this principle
to allow indemnity only to those whose negligence was "passive"
rather than "active, '45 or "secondary" rather than "primary. '40
In determining whether negligence is "active," "primary" or
"independent and concurrent," the test is qualitative, not quanti-
tative.47 Therefore, the doctrine of comparative negligence is
not applicable. A defendant whose negligence is found, for ex-
ample, to have contributed only 30 percent to an accident is still
not entitled to indemnity unless he can show that his negligence
is "passive" in nature.48 Since almost all negligence other than
a failure to discover or prevent the negligence of another is con-
sidered "active," even the negligent failure to adequately warn
of a known (or perhaps even an unknown but discoverable) haz-
ard will bar indemnity.49
4. Where One or More Defendants Have Breached
an Express Warranty
Even assuming there is no reason to hold that the breach
of an "express warranty" which merely expresses warranties al-
ready implied by law is "independent and concurrent" miscon-
duct so as to bar indemnity,50 the considerations are quite dif-
44. See Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d 69
(1970).
45. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 214
Minn. 436, 440, 8 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1943). Cf. Daly v. Bergstedt, 207
Minn. 244, 253, 126 N.W.2d 242, 248 (1964).
46. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., Nos. 43938, 43982
(Minn., filed Feb. 22, 1974); Hillman v. Wallin, 215 N.W.2d 810 (Minn.
1974); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn.
229, 231, 167 N.W. 800, 801 (1918); accord, Larson v. Minneapolis, 262
Minn. 142, 148, 114 N.W.2d 68, 73 (1962).
47. [T]he difference between primary and secondary liability,
as used in determining the right of indemnity, is based not on
a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of com-
parative negligence, but on the difference in the character or
kind of wrongs which caused the injury and in the nature of
the legal obligation owed by each wrongdoer to the injured per-
son.
Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 101, 193 N.W.2d 305,
311 (1971).
48. See Bjorklund v. Hantz, 208 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1973).
49. See, e.g., Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d
69 (1970).
50. For example, the court in Farr noted that there was no evi-
dence of any express warranty given by the retailer where the only
statement made by it was that the tires would be adequate. This state-
ment, said the court, was nothing more than a reaffirmation of what
was already required under an implied warranty of merchantability and
hence could not be considered an "active wrong." 288 Minn. 83, 96,
[Vol. 58:723
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ferent where the express warranty goes beyond the scope of an
implied warranty of merchantability. When a manufacturer, re-
tailer or distributor warrants more than is required by law, he
has in essence gone off on an independent undertaking and
should not be allowed to shift the entire burden of the plain-
tiffs injuries to the shoulders of other parties in the distribu-
tion chain. Although the only direct authority for this position
is found in a federal case applying New York law,51 it was in-
directly suggested by the court in Farr. Noting that recovery
of attorneys' fees and costs were generally not allowed in sit-
uations where the indemnitee had also defended accusations
which encompassed his separate wrongful acts, the Minnesota
court affirmed the trial court's order denying the retailer at-
torneys' fees and costs as part of its indemnification. It reasoned
that.the plaintiff's claims that the retailer had breached express
warranties placed the retailer in the position of defending its
own wrongful conduct. 52 Therefore, its attorneys' fees and costs
were spent in its own behalf.
D. RIGHTS TO CONTRIBUTION IN STRICT LiAB~nI= SITuATIoNs
Although contribution may be available in strict liability
cases where common liability exists among the defendants and
the defendant seeking contribution has been guilty of no "in-
tentional wrongdoing,"53 it is not clear how contribution will
allocate losses among non-negligent parties. Prior to the enact-
ment of the Minnesota comparative negligence statute, all tort-
feasors were liable for contribution in equal amounts. The total
amount of the plaintiff's award was simply divided equally
among all the parties legally responsible for it. 54 The compar-
ative negligence statute, however, provides for contribution "in
179 N.W.2d 64 72 (1970). Accord, Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., Nos.
43938, 43982 (Minn., filed Feb. 22, 1974).
51. See Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1968). In Sylvestai, the jury found that a backhoe was neither unmer-
chantable nor unfit for its intended use, but that the manufacturer had
made -and breached an express warranty that the machine could be
safely used as the plaintiff was using it at the time of the accident.
The manufacturer's breach of his express warranty was held to be an
"active" wrong so as to preclude him from recovering indemnity from
a retailer who was found negligent for failing to warn the plaintiff that
the machine could not safely be used for such purposes.
52. 288 inn. at 97, 179 N.W.2d at 73.
53. See Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn 283, 287, 176 N.W.2d
69, 71 (1970).




proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each
[defendant]."5 If the statute is interpreted literally so as to
allow only a comparison of negligence, excluding comparison of
causal relationships between defendants' acts and plaintiff's in-
jury, contribution among strictly liable defendants still will be
by equal shares.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS
A. THE OBJECTIVES OF INDEMNITY, CONTRIBUTION AND
STRICT LIABILITY
Despite the differences in their application and historical
bases, both indemnity and contribution have the same ultimate
objective. They seek to avoid injustice by requiring an equitable
allocation of liability among joint tortfeasors. Both doctrines
are "used when required by judicial ideas of fairness to secure
restitution." 56  As Dean Prosser has observed with respect to
the rationale underlying the doctrine of contribution:
There is obvious lack of. sense and justice in a rule which per-
mits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were
equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one
alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execu-
tion, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim
or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the
latter goes scot free.57
However, the assertion that contribution is appropriate where
justice requires a sharing of liability while indemnity is proper
where justice requires one of the parties to assume the en-
tire burden58 is a statement of results, not a statement of prin-
ciples. The single principle which the courts try to implement
in both indemnity and contribution cases is simply the principle
that each tortfeasor should be required to pay his just share
of the bill, whether that share be all, part or none. The equit-
able loss sharing among all those whose conduct has caused
harm has long been a goal of tort law.59
Similarly, the object of strict liability is also to achieve an
55. MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971).
56. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368,
371, 104 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1960).
57. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
58. See, e.g., Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 505, 83 N.W.2d 252,
260 (1957).
59. The result also helps to distribute losses over a wider segment
of society. See Werner, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57
CALip. L. REV. 490, 516 (1969). See also Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co.,
281 Minn. 417, 422-23, 161 N.W.2d 657, 660-61 (1968).
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equitable distribution of losses. However, like all substantive
rules of tort law, the doctrine of strict liability reflects an im-
plicit value judgment as to who should ultimately bear a loss.
It is in part premised upon the notion that economic losses
caused by unsafe products should be borne by manufacturers
and distributors of the products who are better able to insure
against or otherwise spread losses among the industry than are
individual consumers.6 0
It is important to realize that both the manufacturer and
the distributor of a defective product are held strictly liable.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court has observed:
Strict liability in tort applies not only to manufacturers but also
to retailers and distributors. The same policy considerations
apply, since both retailers and manufacturers are engaged in
the business of distributing goods to the public. Thus, both are
an integral part of the overall producing and marketing com-
plex that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products.61
This recognition of the importance of marketing in product-
caused injuries leads to the conclusion that the remedial goals
of strict liability cannot be fully achieved simply by shifting
the economic loss from the injured consumer to the "producing
and marketing complex" as a whole. Full implementation of
these goals requires the losses to be further allocated among
all members of the "complex." The problem, of course, is that
in the absence of fault there is no readily available way in which
to further spread the loss.
At least a partial answer is suggested by another, albeit sub-
sidiary, goal of strict liability. Despite strict liability's lack of
concern with "fault" in the traditional sense, deterrence does
remain a viable objective of modern tort law. "[T]he manufac-
turer who is made liable to the consumer for defects in his prod-
uct will do what he can to see that there are no such defects."02
60. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MiNN. L. Ry. 791, 793 (1966). See also Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960).
61. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 96, 179 N.W.2d
64, 72 n.1 (1970).
62. W. PROSsER, LAw OF ToRTs § 4 (3d ed. 1964). Cf. Skaja v. An-
drews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968), where the court
allowed contribution between unintentional violators of the Civil Dam-
age Act, Mnm. STAT. § 340.95 (1971), stating:
Allowing contribution may not demonstrably advance the com-
pensatory objectives of the act in favor of the injured party,
but it will not hinder that objective and it will spread the bur-
den of economic loss more equitably upon the liquor industry.
Secondly, the act by the imposition of the sanction of strict
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The same might be said for retailers, distributors and others in
the chain of distribution even though their conduct is not con-
nected with the creation of a defective product. The view that
losses caused by defective products should fall on all parties who
in any way substantially influenced or aided the plaintiff in ob-
taining the product is reflected in recent decisions indicating
that organizations which grant "seals of approval" and other cer-
tifications of quality, such as the Good Housekeeping Consumer
Guaranty Seal63 or the Underwriters' Laboratories Seal of Ap-
proval,64 may be liable to plaintiffs injured by defective prod-
ucts. These decisions, based on the theory that such certifica-
tions act as a meaningful inducement to purchasers, provide ju-
dicial recognition of the importance of modem merchandising
methods.
B. SOME CrrMcIsMts OF THE PFsENT LAW
The most notable feature of the present law of indemnity
and contribution is that much of it makes little sense even out-
side the context of strict liability. Part of the problem stems
from the fact that courts are often forced to resort to indemnity
in order to achieve some semblance of justice in a particular
case where contribution would be more appropriate 5 but for
liability provides an extremely effective incentive for liquor
vendors to do everything in their power to avoid making illegal
sales .... The allowance of contribution between uninten-
tional violators would serve to increase this incentive, for it will
make more certain that every vendor who makes an illegal sale
will be unable to escape liability for his share of the damages
resulting because of "the accident of a successful levy of execu-
tion, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim
or spite, or his collusion with the wrongdoer" as is possible if
the right to seek contribution were denied.
Making the right of contribution available between uninten-
tional violators will, therefore, distribute the burden of liability
among those commonly liable equally, increase the incentive of
all licensed vendors to guard against illegal sales, and spread
more equitably the economic loss resulting from violations upon
the liquor industry.
281 Minn. at 423-24, 161 N.W.2d at 661 (citation and footnote omitted).
63. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr.
519 (1969).
64. Hempstead v. General Fire Exting. Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D.
Del. 1967).
65. See, e.g., Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193
N.W.2d 305 (1971) (general contractor found 28 percent negligent, held
entitled to indemnity from employer-subcontractor found 55 percent
negligent). See also Hillman v. Wallin, 215 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1974)
(bus driver found 76 percent negligent granted full indemnity against
two passengers, each of whom were found 12 percent negligent); Tromza
v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); Bjorklund v. Hantz,
208 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1973).
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some reason is not available.66 Faced with the unenviable choice
of placing the entire liability upon a defendant who is only
slightly culpable or shifting the entire liability to a defendant
who is largely but not solely at fault, courts simply choose the
lesser of two evils and grant indemnity. 7 Even in those cases
in which contribution is available, it is sometimes more equitable
to shift the entire burden rather than to divide it equally-for
example, where one tortfeasor's negligence contributed only 10
percent to the occurrence of the accident while another's
accounted for 90 percent.68
These problems of allocating liability are particularly well
illustrated in Haney v. International Harvester Co.00 where, be-
cause contribution was not available, indemnity was allowed
even though the indemnitee was personally as opposed to vicar-
iously guilty. The plaintiff in Haney brought suit against the
manufacturer of a truck claiming that a defect existing in the
truck at the time of its manufacture caused the accident in
which he was injured. The manufacturer in turn brought an
action against the plaintiff's employer, who had been forced to
pay workmen's compensation to the plaintiff as a result of the
accident, alleging that any defect in the truck was attributable
to his conduct. The trial court dismissed the manufacturer's ac-
tion. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that con-
tribution was not available to the manufacturer because the em-
ployer's liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
exclusive, and therefore he and the manufacturer were not com-
monly liable.70 The court also pointed out that indemnity
would not ordinarily be available because the case did not fall
within any of the five categories set forth in Hendrickson.1
66. For examples of situations in which contribution is not avail-
able see section IV-C infra.
67. Cf. cases cited in note 65 supra.
68. See Furnish, Distributing Tort Liability: Contribution and In-
demnity in Iowa, 52 IowA L. Rnv. 31, 50 (1966). Cf. Lawrence v. Great
Northern Ry., 109 F. Supp. 552, 555 (D. Minn. 1942), affd sub nom.,
Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 201 F.2d 408, 416 (8th
Cir. 1953).
69. 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972).
70. The relevant section of the Workmen's Compensation Act is
MlNx. STAT. § 176.031 (1971). The section provides that if an employer
fails to insure or self-insure his liability for workmen's compensation,
the employee may maintain an action at law in which the emnloyer
is deprived of the defenses of contributory negligence (unless willful),
assumption of risk or injury by fellow servant. See Fox v. Swartz
228 Minn. 233, 36 N.W.2d 708 (1949).
71. The court may be wrong in assuming that the five Hendrickson
categories are exclusive. See cases cited in note 4 supra and text ac-
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However, obviously troubled by the injustice of denying both
contribution and indemnity to a party who was only 10 percent
negligent while at the same time allowing the 90 percent negli-
gent employer to recoup all the workmen's compensation bene-
fits which it had paid, the court held that it would reconsider
granting indemnification where there was "great disparity in the
degree of fault of the parties."72  The trial court's order was
reversed and the case remanded for trial, with instructions to
determine the percentages of negligence attributable to the man-
ufacturer and the employer.
Unfortunately, indemnity is also frequently used, with re-
sults that border on the preposterous, in cases where contribu-
tion would clearly be more appropriate. For example, in Bjork-
lund v. Hantz73 -a retailer found by the jury to have been 30
percent negligent was awarded indemnity from a manufacturer
found 45 percent negligent.7 4 In that case, the court held that
the retailer's negligence was not "active," because it consisted
solely of not discovering and correcting the defective condition
of the product. Stating that the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence applied only in contribution cases and ignoring the avail-
ability of contribution, the court rejected the manufacturer's
contention that liability should have been apportioned in rela-
tion to the adjudicated percentages of negligence. This truly
is a triumph of historical accident over common sense.
As applied to strict liability, present day principles of in-
demnity seem even more outmoded and illogical. Because they
look to the relative culpability of the defendants, the traditional
rules governing indemnity disregard the importance of non-neg-
ligent or otherwise faultless conduct in bringing about product-
caused injuries. Unless their conduct in some way amounts to
"active fault, 5 retailers and distributors are free to promote
goods of any quality, secure in the knowledge that any liability
companying notes 3-4 supra; Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 114
N.W.2d 68 (1962). But see Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 291 Minn. 105,
189 N.W.2d 701 (1971).
72. Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 385, 201
N.W.2d 140, 146 (1972).
73. 208 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1973).
74. The operator of the defective snowmobile which injured plain-
tiff was found 25 percent negligent. Id. at 723.
75. "The right of indemnity inures to a person who, without active
fault on his part, has been compelled by reason of a legal obligation
to pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of another and for
which he himself is only secondarily liable." Keefer v. Al Johnson
Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 100, 193 N.W.2d 305, 310 (1971).
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which results from selling defective products can usually be
shifted to the one who created the defective condition. The abil-
ity of retailers and distributors to shift the entire liability result-
ing -from their own activities to others destroys the deterrent
effect of strict liability by making it impossible to allocate losses
among all those who, in the regular course of their businesses,
derive economic gain from the sale of defective products.
What courts have overlooked is that the conduct involved
in wholly "faultless" marketing methods may constitute a
greater cause of harm to the public than the conduct which cre-
ated the defective product in the first place. The manufacturer
of a defective product may be a small, inexperienced concern,
with little capital and little or no ability to market its own prod-
uct. Moreover, the manufacturer's gross profit derived from
creating the product may be small when compared to that of
the large, nationwide concern which packages, promotes and dis-
tributes it. If losses should be allocated in relation to benefits
derived from the activity which caused the loss, traditional no-
tions of fault are as irrelevant in deciding whether Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. is allowed indemnity from the manufacturer who
operates out of his garage as they are in determining the in-
jured plaintiff's right of recovery in the first instance. Further-
more, when ultimate liability is shifted upward along the dis-
tribution ladder, the entire loss may come to rest upon a defend-
ant whose conduct was entirely unrelated to the creation of the
defective product simply because the party who actually created
the defective condition is not subject to service of process, is
uninsured or is just plain broke.7 6 In these cases, the ultimate
imposition of liability is fortuitous and is entirely unrelated to
any policy objective.
Of course, the simplest solution to the problems caused by
common law indemnity and contribution is the abolition of both
doctrines and the creation of an entirely new rule stripped of
historical anachronisms and semantic absurdities, which would
allocate responsibility among all persons whose conduct was in
some significant manner responsible for the plaintiff's loss. The
doctrine could even be christened with an appealing new name
such as "comparative responsibility." Under the guise of "par-
tial indemnification," the New York Court of Appeals has come
close to doing just this, at least in negligence cases. In Dole
76. This disposes of the contention of some that every defective
condition is properly attributable only to someone at "fault'. See text
following note 96 infra.
19741
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
v. Dow Chemical Co.,7 7 the court renounced the "active-passive"
negligence test for indemnity and instead held "that where a
third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but
not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast in dam-
ages. . . there must necessarily be an apportionment of respon-
sibility in negligence between those parties. '"78  This decision,
imposing liability in proportion to responsibility, is remarkable
not only because New York is not a comparative negligence ju-
risdiction,7 ' but also because a New York statute provides for
contribution only by equal shares.80
It has been suggested, apparently in all seriousness, that
sellers and manufacturers of defective products be limited to
contribution in proportion to relative volumes of business.8 At
least one writer has even questioned whether indemnity should
ever be allowed among those engaged in the manufacture and
sale of defective goods. He reasoned that as "partners" in an
"enterprise" manufacturers and distributors should always share
the cost of injuries to the consuming public.8 2 However, in view
of the court's adherence to traditional doctrine in Haney8" and
Bjorklund 4 it is likely that inertia will prevail over common
sense, and that in Minnesota contribution and indemnity will
remain separate and distinct concepts. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible that some of the problems caused by common law indem-
nity and contribution can be alleviated, if not solved, without
a revolutionary change in tort law. Contribution is currently
available in most products liability cases, since the element of
common liability is usually present.85 If the provision of the
77. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
78. Id. at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
79. See Comment, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 815, 832 n.104 (1972).
80. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAWS & RULES § 1401 (McKinney 1973).
81. See Note, The Right to Indemnity in Products Liability Cases,
1964 U. ILL. L.F. 614, 630-31.
82. Anderson, Product Liability-What is the End of the Road?,
76 CASE & COMMENT 50, 52 (1971).
83. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
84. The court held that, since the retailer was entitled to indemnity
under Hendrickson, there was no need to apportion liability in accord-
ance with the adjudicated percentages of negligence. It stated:
This is not the rule, however, with respect to indemnity, which
is an equitable doctrine of longstanding [sic]. Its application
is reserved for those rare cases in which the parties seeking
indemnity have been guilty of no active negligence. We are
not disposed to lightly overrule these well-established princi-
ples. In any event, the facts of this case do not make it a
proper vehicle for so doing.
Bjorklund v. Hantz, 208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1973).
85. See section IV-C(1) infra.
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Minnesota Comparative Negligence Statute providing for contri-
bution based on the percentage of negligence is expanded so
as to operate on all theories of tort liability, the resulting "com-
parative cause" statute will provide a means of equitable loss
allocation among all defendants whether negligent or strictly li-
able. Thus, a simple curtailment of the use of indemnity cou-
pled with a liberal utilization of the comparative negligence stat-
ute could lead to an equitable system of loss allocation.
IV. A PROPOSED GENERAL RULE
A. T3E RuLE
It is submitted that the following general rule is both equi-
table and logically consistent with contemporary objectives of
the law of torts:
One held liable for personal injury resulting from a defec-
tive product manufactured or sold by him in the ordinary
course of business may not recover indemnity from anyone if:
(a) he was negligent with respect to the product, breached
an express warranty or misrepresented, intentionally or in-
nocently, the product and such conduct was a direct cause
of the injury; or,
(b) his independent conduct with respect to the product,
apart from any conduct directly related to the defect itself,
was a direct cause of the injury.
A party so denied indemnity may recover contribution from
all other persons legally responsible for the injury, contributions
to awards being in proportion to the percentage of causal con-
duct attributable to each such person responsible.
So formulated, the rule concerns itself not so much with
traditional notions of "fault" or degrees of fault, but rather with
independent, causal conduct. While the proposed rule recognizes
that complete indemnification may be appropriate in some cases,
it also recognizes that under modern commercial conditions
many forms of wholly "faultless" conduct are so causally related
to product-caused injuries that indemnity is inequitable and in-
consistent with the social policies and remedial goals of contem-
porary tort law.
B. TsE RuiE's BAsic APPLICATION
Application of the proposed rule to traditional "fault" sit-
uations is relatively simple: (a) a defendant found to have been
causally negligent is denied indemnity, and there is no need to
determine the kind, character or degree of his negligence; (b)
a defendant found to have breached an express warranty going
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beyond the scope of an implied warranty of merchantability, 0
or found to have intentionally or negligently misrepresented the
product, 7 is also denied indemnity if his conduct was a direct
cause of the plaintiff's loss.
Application of the rule to situations involving "faultless" de-
fendants is somewhat more complex. The jury must assess the
total marketing activities and other non-defect-causing conduct
of each defendant to determine whether that conduct, apart
from the defect itself, was so causally related to the accident
as to constitute an independent and concurrent cause of the
plaintiff's injury. In making such a determination, the jury
could use the following criteria: (a) the extent to which con-
duct of a defendant induced the plaintiff to purchase the product
which caused his injury; (b) the extent to which the conduct of
the defendant was motivated by a justifiable reliance upon the
proper conduct of others; (c) the economic gain derived by each
defendant as a result of his conduct in comparison to such gains
derived by other defendants; and (d) the likelihood of the acci-
dent not happening at all in the absence of the defendant's con-
duct.
Applying these criteria, the jury in many cases may con-
clude that a retailer's independent conduct-the mere act of sell-
ing-although subjecting him to liability to the plaintiff, is so
insignificant in relation to the conduct of others that it does
not constitute an independent and concurrent cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. For example, if a consumer enters a hardware
store and asks for a "Stanley" claw hammer of a particular style
and weight, a jury might conclude that the store's conduct in
complying with the consumer's specific demand was insignificant
in relation to the conduct of the manufacturer who produced
the defective hammer since: (a) the store did little to induce
the sale of the particular kind of hammer which caused the
plaintiff's injuries; (b) the store's decision to sell "Stanley" ham-
mers to the public was made in reliance upon the manufacturer's
long-standing and excellent reputation in the hand tool indus-
try; (c) the annual profit derived by the store from the sale
86. It is questionable whether statements which merely express the
warranties already implied by law can be considered express warran-
ties. See generally Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., Nos. 43938, 43982
(Minn., filed Feb. 22, 1974); Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 291 Minn. 105,
189 N.W.2d 701 (1971).
87. Misrepresentation is a viable theory in products liability litiga-




of "Stanley" hammers is negligible when compared to the profits
derived by their manufacturer; and (d) if the store had not sup-
plied the consumer with the particular hammer he requested,
he would simply have purchased it elsewhere.
However, there are situations where a jury could well reach
the opposite result. For example, assume that a large shipment
of claw hammers manufactured in a foreign country lies un-
claimed on the docks of New York. Finally the entire shipment
is purchased by an importer at a price equal to the outstanding
shipping and storage charges. A local chain of hardware stores,
learning of the importer's purchase, buys the entire shipment
from him, paying a price which yields the importer a profit of
25 percent. In its advertising, the hardware chain offers the
hammers for sale to the public at a price of $1.99 each. This
price is about one-half the retail price of any other hammer sold
by the chain, but because the hammers were obtained so cheaply,
it represents a 100 percent profit on each hammer sold. Plain-
tiff responds to the chain's television and newspaper advertising
and buys, one of the hammers. Unfortunately, every hammer
in the shipment, including the one purchased by the plaintiff,
is defective but the defect is such that it cannot be discovered
with reasonable inspection. While properly using the hammer,
plaintiff sustains serious injury when its head shatters. In the
resulting action by plaintiff against the hardware chain and im-
porter, both are found free from negligence but are held strictly
liable in tort for breaching implied warranties of merchantabil-
ity.
Since both the retailer and importer are free from "fault,"
under present Minnesota law the retailer would be entitled to
indemnity from the importer.88 However, a jury could easily
conclude that the retailer's "faultless" conduct with respect to
the offending hammer was an independent and concurrent cause
of the plaintiff's injury since: (a) the sale of the hammer to
plaintiff was induced by the retailer's advertising; (b) there was
little, if any, justifiable reliance by the retailer upon the due
care of the unknown manufacturer or upon the selection exper-
tise of the importer; (c) keeping in mind that both retailer and
importer were acting pro hac vice with respect to this particular
shipment of hammers, the profit of the retailer was four times
that of the importer; and (d) it is highly unlikely that plain-
88. See Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 96-97, 179
N.W.2d 64, 72 (1970).
1974]
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tiff would or could have purchased the hammer in the absence
of the retailer's purchasing and marketing activities.
One of the more revolutionary aspects of the rule is that
it leaves questions as to the availability of indemnity to the jury.
Traditionally, even "factual" questions have generally been de-
termined by the court insofar as rights to indemnity were con-
cerned.89 Yet there is no rule of law which requires issues of
indemnity to be decided by the court. Rather, the court often
determines the availability of indemnity simply because it has
not been asked to submit the question to the jury.90 It is freely
conceded that the availability of indemnity will no longer be
"predictable" if the issue is left to the jury under relatively gen-
eral instructions. However, it is not clear that predictability
was ever a true goal of traditional indemnity law. Even the
Minnesota Supreme Court recently observed that "indemnity is
an equitable doctrine which does not lend itself to hard-and-
fast rules, and . . . its application depends upon the particular
facts of each case."91 Moreover, the Minnesota case law suggests
that in fact very little "predictability" results from the use of
89. See, e.g., Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193
N.W.2d 305 (1971); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 136
N.W.2d 677 (1965); Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242
(1964).
90. In this context, Mh n. R. Civ. P. 49.01, dealing with special
verdicts, provides:
If ... the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings
or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial byjury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted
without such demand, the court may make a finding; or, if it
fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
The inattention of trial counsel to the indemnity issue is well il-
lustrated in Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d 69
(1970), where the court observed:
It may be noted that where cross-claims for indemnity between
multiple tortfeasors are consolidated and tried with plaintiff's
claims against such tortfeasors, an appellate court would expe-
rience far less difficulty in deciding the type of issue raised
on this appeal if the party seeking indemnity had at trial re-
quested the court to include in the special verdict specific ques-
tions concerning each claim of negligence.
Id. at 287, 176 N.W.2d at 72.
91. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 96, 179 N.W.2d
64, 72 (1970). See Hillman v. Wallin, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Minn. 1974)
("[W]e will have to permit indemnity on a case by case basis where
our sense of fundamental fairness seems to require it.").
92. An example of such a word formula is the "active-passive"
negligence test approved by the court in Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn.
244, 253, 126 N.W.2d 242, 248 (1964).
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word formulas92 or liability classifications93 applied by trial
courts.
9 4
Another possible criticism of the rule is that the criteria
proposed as guides for the jury are so general as to allow the
jury almost unlimited discretion in determining if indemnity
should be allowed. However, the criteria are no more vague
than the standards which Minnesota juries have long used to
determine negligence (i.e., "doing ... something which a rea-
sonable person would not do, or the failure to do something
which a reasonable person would do, under like circum-
stances"' 9 5) and proximate cause (i.e., "a cause which had a sub-
stantial part in bringing about the [accident] "1). Indeed, since
the jury is in theory a cross-section of the community, composed
of persons of diverse backgrounds and experience, it would seem
far more qualified than a trial court judge to assess the rela-
tive impact of marketing activities in bringing about a product-
caused injury.
Finally, even if the premise can be accepted that indemnity
for losses stemming from defective conditions should be allowed
only when the indemnitor is at fault, the right to indemnity
from the party at fault is valueless unless he is available and
able to pay a judgment. The proposed rule would be justified
if it did nothing more than eliminate the injustice that occurs
when a "faultless" seller is required to indemnify all subsequent
parties in the chain of distribution because of inability to obtain
redress in turn from the party who actually produced the de-
fective good.
C. Two IMDPEDIMTS TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULE
1. Common Liability as a Prerequisite to Contribution
Obviously, full implementation of the rule will be thwarted
in'those cases where indemnity is inappropriate but contribution
is unavailable because the defendants are not commonly liable.
This, however, may not be as large a problem as it seems. Con-
93. Compare Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258
Minn 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960) with Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495,
83 N.W.2d 252 (1957).
94. For a discussion in a non-Minnesota setting, see Tromza v. Te-
cumseh Prods. Co., 253 F. Supp. 26 (Wi). Pa. 1966), -rev'd, 378 F.2d
601 (3d Cir. 1967) (one judge dissenting).
95. Proposed Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides, Civil IA Instruc-
tion 101 G-S (1974).
96. Id., Instruction 140 G-S.
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mon liability is lacking only where one tortfeasor has a "per-
sonal defense" existing at the very instant the tort is committed.
Defenses which arise after the tortious act are of no moment.
Thus, the common liability necessary for contribution is not de-
stroyed if one tortfeasor secures a covenant not to sue from the
plaintiff,97 nor is it destroyed if the statute of limitations runs
against one tortfeasor,98 nor if a municipality has a defense
based upon the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of
a claim.9 9 In addition, personal defenses or "immunities" are
on the wane in Minnesota. Sovereign immunity is now strictly
circumscribed,10 0 and the Supreme Court of Minnesota has re-
cently abrogated interspousal immunity, 0 1 a child's immunity
for a tort against its parent,'0 2 and a parent's immunity for a
tort against his child. 0 3 In the absence of immunities of these
kinds, common liability will almost always be present in prod-
ucts liability cases.
The easiest solution to the problems caused by lack of com-
mon liability in cases where contribution is sought is to follow
the lead of courts which have recently allowed contribution from
a person immune from suit by the plaintiff on the ground that
the immunity does not apply to liability. 0 4 Although this view
has been rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court, 0 6 it is pos-
97. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235
Minn. 304, 50 N.W.2d 689 (1951).
98. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364, 51 N.W.2d
108, 112 (1952); Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
99. White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965). But
see Hillman v. Wallin, 215 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1974), where a school
bus driver was held liable to the injured plaintiff because of his negli-
gent failure to supervise two passengers whose "active" negligence in-
jured the plaintiff. Because the bus driver was only "secondarily li-
able," the court concluded that the element of common liability was
lacking, even though it acknowledged that the bus driver was "100 per-
cent responsible for his negligence." Id. at 814. It is difficult to explain
how common liability can be lacking where all three defendants are
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. See also discussion of
Bjorklund v. Hantz in text accompanying note 73 supra.
100. See MiN. STAT. § 466.02 (1971); Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
101. Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969).
102. Balts v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
103. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
104. Weinberg v. Underwood, 101 N.J. Co. 448, 244 A.2d 538 (1968);
Restifo v. McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967); Zarrella v. Miller,
100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192
A.2d 24 (1963). See generally Forney, Employer's Liability for Contri-
bution or Indemnity, 34 INs. CouNsEL J. 362, 362-64 (1967).
105. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.
2d 847 (1953). Although the court has not indicated that it is prepared
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sible that the requirement of common liability for contribution
can be abrogated through the use of the same legal fiction which
allows indemnity in the absence of common liability: a party
should be liable for contribution as well as for indemnity where
he has breached a duty to another by conducting himself in such
a way as to subject such other party to legal liability.
2. Employer's Immunity Under Workmen's Compensation Stat-
utes
One immunity that will impede full utilization of a sensible
loss allocation system is that belonging to an employer when
his employee is injured in the course of his employment. In
such cases the Workmen's Compensation Act provides the exclu-
sive means by which the injured employee can recover from his
employer.10 6 Although the employer may be liable to a third
party tortfeasor for indemnity,10 7 he is never liable for contri-
bution because of the absence of common liability.05 This
anomalous situation can be corrected only by abolishing the re-
quirement of common liability-perhaps by substituting a test
of "common tortious conduct"109-or accomplishing the same re-
sult through an allowance of "partial indemnity."" 0
The situation has been further complicated by the recent
enactment of MINEOTA STATUTEs § 176.061 (10), which purports
to abolish an employer's liability for indemnity."' However,
to overrule Moling, it did comment in White v. Johnson, 272 Minn.
363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965) as follows:
[slince the right to recover contribution is based on equitable
principles and has the objective of compelling joint wrongdoers
to share responsibility for damages inflicted by their tortious
acts, the conduct of the person from whom contribution is
sought ought to control the right to maintain the action.
Id. at 371, 137 N.W.2d at 679.
106. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
107. Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d
305 (1971). But see text accompanying notes 111-12 infra.
108. But see Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minm. 375,
201 N.W.2d 140 (1972).
109. This test was expressly rejected in American Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Molling, 239 Minn. 74 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953), but it finds some support
in White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965). See note
105 supra.
110. But see text accompanying note 21 supra.
111. MInm. STAT. § 176.061(10) (1971) provides:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the em-
ployee, the employer, or both jointly against the third person.
results in judgment against such third person, or settlement by
such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reim-
burse or hold such third person harmless on such judgments
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this statutory provision was held unconstitutional in the recent
case of Carlson v. Smogard,"2 where the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a statutory abrogation of common law rights
to indemnity violates due process. The court did not make the
same observation with respect to a common law denial of rights
to contribution.
V. PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULE
A. COMPARISON OF CAUSAL CONDUCT AS THE BASIS FOR Loss
ALLOCATION AMONG TORTFEASORS
The enactment of the Minnesota comparative negligence
statute" 3 has removed previously existing procedural barriers
to an equitable loss allocation system. Indeed, application of
the rule proposed by this Article hinges upon the rationale un-
derlying that statute. While, of course, a comparative negli-
gence statute speaks only of negligence, the rationale of the Min-
nesota statute may be extended so as to require the comparison
of all legal causes of the plaintiff's injuries, whether they were
caused by negligent or faultless conduct on the part of the de-
fendants. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has achieved precisely
this result based on an almost identical statute.1 1 4 In Dippel
v. Sciano" 5 the court held that strict liability in tort, as ex-
pressed in section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,1 1 6
could be considered "negligence per se" for the purpose of ap-
plying Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute. Therefore,
the court reasoned that the strict liability of a defendant could
be compared to any contributory negligence of the plaintiff." 7
or settlements in absence of a written agreement to do so exe-
cuted prior to the injury.
The statute became effective on September 1, 1969, and has not been
applied retroactively. Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 187 N.W.2d 689
(1971).
112. 215 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1974).
113. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1971).
114. The first sentence of the Minnesota statute is actually a verba-
tim copy of WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (1973). See Olson v. Hartwig, 288
Minn. 375, 180 N.W.2d 870 (1970).
115. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See text ac-
companying note 23 supra.
117. But in his concurring opinion, Justice Hallows expressed the
view that the court was really not adopting strict liability, but rather
was holding that a seller who meets the requirements of section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS is guilty of negligence as a mat-
ter of law. Strict liability, said Justice Hallows, is inconsistent with
the doctrine of comparative negligence. 37 Wis. 2d at 464, 155 N.W.2d
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The result achieved by this creative legal fiction is highly
commendable in light of the accepted principle that "strict li-
ability [is] not absolute liability."'118 Moreover, this construc-
tion of the statute permits a just and sensible method of loss
allocation. Since the "faultless" conduct of the defendant can
be compared with the plaintiffs negligence, there is no reason
Why a similar comparison of causal conduct cannot be made
among all defendants as well.
B. USE OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT
Special verdicts" 9 are widely used in Minnesota, primarily
because of the comparative negligence statute. Like the doctrine
of comparative negligence, the rule proposed in this Article
would be impracticable if only general verdicts were used. How-
ever the specific findings of fact contemplated by the special
verdict procedure render the proposed rule feasible since its ap-
plication to a typical products liability case would entail simply
the addition of one question per defendant to the customary spe-
cial verdict form. For example, in the hypothetical case of the
imported claw hammers, 20 the following form of special verdict
might be used:' 2 '
1. Was plaintiff negligent in his use of the hammer? Axns. No
2. If so, was such negligence a direct cause of his injury? Ans.
3. At the time the hammer left the possession of importer,
was it in a defective condition making it unreasonably
dangerous to plaintiff? Axis. Yes
4. If so, was such defect a direct cause of plaintiff's injury? Axis. Yes
5. At the time the hammer left the possession of retailer,
was it in a defective condition making it unreasonably
dangerous to plaintiff? Axis. Yes
6. If so, was such defect a direct cause of plaintiff's injury? Arts. Yes
7. Was importer negligent with respect to the hammer? Axis. Yes
8. If so, was such negligence a direct cause of plaintiff's in-
jury? Axs. Yes
9. Was retailer negligent with respect to the hammer? Ans. No
at 65. The latter statement was grounded upon the erroneous equation
of strict liability with absolute liability.
118. Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 45, 171 N.W.2d 201,
209 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
119. Special verdicts are authorized by MhNN. I. Crv. P. 49.
120. See section IV-B supra.
121. The special verdict form set out in the text assumes that there
is no dispute as to whether the importer and retailer are in the business
of selling hand tools or as to whether the hammer reached plaintiff
without any substantial change from the condition in which it was sold
by both importer and retailer. The last question is the additional find-
ing required by the proposed rule.
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10. If so, was such negligence a direct cause of plaintiff's in-
jury? Ans.
11. Did retailer breach an express warranty in connection
with its sale of the hammer to plaintiff? Ans. No
12. If so, was such breach of express warranty a direct cause
of plaintiffs injury? Ans.
13. Was the independent conduct of the importer with re-
spect to the hammer, aside from any conduct directly re-
lated to any defect therein, a direct cause of plaintiff's
injury? Ans. Yes
14. Was the independent conduct of retailer with respect to
the hammer, aside from any conduct directly related to
any defect therein, a direct cause of plaintiff's injury? Ans. Yes
15. Taking all of the causes which contributed to the acci-
dent (as determined by your answers to questions 2, 4, 6,
8, 10, 12, 13 and 14), what percentage or proportion





There is no need to ask whether either the retailer or the
importer breached an implied warranty of merchantability, un-
less notice or privity is a problem,122 since this matter is fully
determined by the answers relating to the product's condition.
While it is highly desirable under existing law to set forth each
type of negligence raised by the evidence in separate ques-
tions,123 this practice is unnecessary under the proposed rule be-
cause any kind of negligence will preclude the recovery of in-
demnity.
Assuming the jury assesses plaintiff's damages at $100,000,
the trial court under the proposed rule will order judgment in
that amount against both defendants. It will also deny indem-
nity to both defendants, even though the importer was negligent
and the retailer was not, and will award contribution to each
defendant in proportion to the percentage of causal conduct at-
tributable to each. Thus, the retailer will ultimately pay $40,000
of the plaintiff's judgment and the importer will pay $60,000.
VI. CONCLUSION
Particularly as applied to strict liability situations, the pres-
ent system of loss allocation among tortfeasors is both illogical
122. It should be noted that notice or privity may well pose prob-
lems in the determination of the rights of defendants inter se. See note
39 supra.
123. Compare Bjorklund v. Hantz, 208 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1973)
with Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d 69 (1970).
See note 89 supra.
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and unjust. First, the availability of indemnity, with its focus
on the quality of the defendant's negligence, results in reference
to the relative fault of the parties in situations where, at least
in its legal sense, "fault" does not necessarily exist. Second,
the ability of a distributor to shift liability to prior links in the
distribution chain is inconsistent with the substantial role that
modern merchandising and marketing activities have in bring-
ing about product-caused injuries.
While the most sensible solution to these problems entails
the abolition of indemnity and contribution as separate concepts,
substantial improvement can be effected through relatively
minor changes in substantive tort law coupled with full utiliza-
tion of special verdicts and the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence. If the provision of the Minnesota comparative negligence
statute providing for, contribution based on percentage of negli-
gence is expanded so as to operate on all theories of tort liability,
the resulting "comparative cause" statute will provide a means
of equitable loss allocation among all defendants whether negli-
gent or strictly liable.
Indemnity and contribution, in the words of Mr. Justice
Kelly, are "equitable remedies which by their very nature are
constantly being changed to right otherwise unrightable
wrongs."'24 It is hoped that the approach set forth in this Arti-
cle is not an impossible dream but rather a practical alternative
to the quixotic system of loss allocation now employed by the
courts.
124. Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 386, 201
N.W.2d 140, 146 (1972).
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